Antimatter by Baker, David & Halvorson, Hans
Antimatter
David John Baker and Hans Halvorson
June 16, 2008
ABSTRACT
The nature of antimatter is examined in the context of algebraic quantum field theory. It
is shown that the notion of antimatter is more general than that of antiparticles. Properly
speaking, then, antimatter is not matter made up of antiparticles — rather, antiparticles
are particles made up of antimatter. We go on to discuss whether the notion of antimatter
is itself completely general in quantum field theory. Does the matter-antimatter distinction
apply to all field theoretic systems? The answer depends on which of several possible criteria
we should impose on the space of physical states.
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1 Introduction
Antimatter is matter made up of antiparticles, or so they say. To every fundamental particle
there corresponds an antiparticle of opposite charge and otherwise identical properties. (But
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some neutral particles are their own antiparticles.) These facts have been known for some
time — the first hint of them came when Dirac’s “hole theory” of the relativistic electron
predicted the existence of the positron. So they say.
All this is true enough, at a certain level of description. But if recent work in the
philosophy of quantum field theory (QFT) is any indication, it must all be false at the
fundamental level. After all, the facts about antimatter listed above are all facts about
particles. And at a fundamental level, there are no particles, according to some of the
best recent work in the philosophy of QFT.1 This would seem to render the concept of
antimatter irrelevant to matters of fundamental ontology. For if only particles can properly
be called “anti” or not, and particles are no part of QFT’s most basic ontology, it follows
that the most basic things in a field theoretic universe cannot be categorized into matter
and antimatter. Although “Matter comes in particle and antiparticle form. . . Particles are
emergent phenomena, which emerge in domains where the underlying quantum field can be
treated as approximately linear” (Wallace, 2008, p. 15).
Considered in light of some of the most important research in algebraic QFT (AQFT),
these matters are not so simple. We will show in what follows that there may be a fundamen-
tal matter-antimatter distinction to be drawn in QFT. Whether there is does not depend on
whether particles play any part in the theory’s fundamental ontology. Rather, it depends on
which criteria we use to determine which of the theory’s mathematically well-defined states
represent real possibilities, and which are surplus theoretical structure or (in the physicist’s
parlance) unphysical.
2 Antiparticles on the naive picture
A standard, naive picture of antimatter begins with the notion of antiparticle that emerges
from quantum mechanics (QM) governed by free relativistic wave equations. The simplest
1See Halvorson and Clifton (2001), Fraser (forthcoming), Malament (1996) and Halvorson and Clifton
(2002) for arguments to this effect. Theories which do admit particles have been put forward as empirically
equivalent to QFT (Du¨rr et al., 2005). Such Bohmian field theories (also called “Bell-type QFTs”) are
beyond the scope of this work, as we are concerned solely with the interpretation of QFT’s extant formalism.
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of these is the Klein-Gordon equation (KGE) for a spin-zero particle2
(+m2)φ(x) = 0, (1)
and the simplest case of antiparticles arises when we consider its complex solutions.
A solution to the KGE can be expressed as a linear combination of plane waves
ϕk = exp(ikax
a) (2)
where the wave vector k satisfies the rest mass condition kak
a = m2. If ka is a future-
directed vector, then ϕk is called a “positive-frequency” wave;
3 if it is past-directed, ϕk
is called “negative-frequency.” A linear combination of positive-frequency waves satisfying
the KGE is called a “positive-frequency” solution (or a positive-frequency scalar field), and
“negative-frequency” solutions are likewise defined as combinations of negative-frequency
waves.
What happens to a positive-frequency solution if we take its complex conjugate in the
position basis, i.e. map φ(x)→ φ∗(x)? A plane wave (2) becomes ϕ∗k = exp(−ikaxa). Thus
conjugating the plane wave is the same as taking ka to −ka. If ka is future-directed, −ka
is past-directed, so the complex conjugate of a positive-frequency solution is a negative-
frequency solution.
Normally to find the energy of a particle with wave vector ka in a reference frame with
unit normal na we take the inner product nak
a. If ka is past-directed, this gives a negative
result, so it seems that negative-frequency solutions must correspond to negative-energy
particles. But actually this needn’t be so, if we construct the Hilbert space of KGE solutions
properly. Quantum mechanically, the energy observable corresponds to the operator
Eˆφ =
~
i
na∇aφ. (3)
This might seem to strictly entail that negative-frequency solutions have negative energy.
But in fact, when forming a Hilbert space from the KGE solutions, we need to make a choice
of complex structure. That is, we need to define what it is to multiply a state vector φ by
2Where the D’Alambertian  = ∇a∇a.
3This because the frequency ω of a wave is proportional to the wave number k0.
3
a complex number α, so that the set of solutions satisfies the axioms of a complex vector
space. One possible complex structure is just to define αφ in the “obvious” way as αφ(x),
that is, to just multiply the scalar field by the number α. But another possible choice — the
right choice — is to begin by decomposing φ(x) into a positive-frequency part φ+(x) and a
negative-frequency part φ−(x). Then the operation αφ can be defined as αφ+(x)+α∗φ−(x).4
If we use the correct complex structure instead of the (naively) obvious one, then for a
negative-frequency state φ we have
Eˆφ =
~
i
na∇aφ = −~
i
na∇aφ(x), (4)
which implies that a negative-frequency plane wave ϕ−k has the same energy as its positive-
frequency counterpart ϕk. In general, conjugate fields φ(x) and φ
∗(x) will have the same
(positive) energy.5
But not all physical quantities remain the same when we conjugate. The KGE is sym-
metric under the group U(1) of phase transformations (φ(x)→ eiθφ(x)); we say that U(1) is
an internal symmetry or gauge group of Klein-Gordon theory. When we derive the existence
of a conserved current J from this symmetry, we find that
Ja(x) = φ
∗(x)∇aφ(x)− φ(x)∇aφ∗(x). (5)
Complex conjugation reverses the sign of Ja(x), so that φ(x) and φ
∗(x) would appear to
carry opposite charge.6
All of this is relativistic QM; we haven’t constructed a Klein-Gordon QFT yet. To do so
we take the “one-particle” Hilbert spaceH of KGE solutions that we constructed by imposing
4If we impose the wrong (naively obvious) complex structure instead, we end up with a theory with no
lower bound on the total energy. This is both radically empirically inadequate (since we observe ground
states in nature) and contrary to rigorous axioms for quantum theories.
5Dirac addressed the analogous problem of interpreting negative-frequency solutions to his equation for
the relativistic electron by proposing his “hole theory.” This treated negative-frequency Dirac fields as
negative-energy electron states, and posited that all of the negative-energy states are occupied in the ground
state. An unoccupied negative-energy state will behave like a positron. This solution only works for fermions
because of the exclusion principle, and cannot be applied to boson field equations like the KGE. Furthermore,
the problem of negative-frequency solutions of the Dirac equation can also be solved by choosing the proper
complex structure, so Dirac’s method would seem to be outmoded.
6To derive a conservation law from a symmetry, one employs Noether’s theorem (Ticciati, 2003, pp.
36–53).
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our complex structure and build a symmetric Fock space F from it. From a heuristic point
of view, a Fock space is needed because relativistic systems can undergo changes in particle
number. Thus, we take the direct sum of all symmetric (because we’re dealing with bosons)
n-particle Hilbert spaces with the right complex structure:
F = C⊕H⊕ S(H⊗H)⊕ S(H⊗H⊗H)⊕ · · · (6)
where S(V) is the symmetric subspace of a Hilbert space V .
A state Ψ in Fock space will take the form of an ordered set
Ψ = [ξ, φ1, φ2, φ3, ...] (7)
with ξ a complex number and φi an i-particle
7 Klein-Gordon wavefunction (i.e., an i-rank
symmetric tensor on H). From the vacuum state,
Ψ0 = [1, 0, 0, ...], (8)
we can construct a multi-particle Fock space state by introducing “creation” and “annihi-
lation” operators. For an i-particle KG wavefunction φi and a one-particle wavefunction f ,
S(f ⊗ φi), where S is the symmetrization operation, in effect composes φi with a particle of
wavefunction f . Thus the creation operator a∗(f) defined by
a∗(f)Ψ = [0, ξf, S(f ⊗ φ1), S(f ⊗ φ2)...], (9)
where S denotes symmetrization, transforms the state Ψ by adding a particle of wavefunction
f . Conversely, its adjoint a(f) removes a particle of wavefunction f , and so is called an
annihilation operator. Now, in the complex KG Fock space we can actually define two
different creation operators. The wavefunction f can be equally well represented by its
Fourier transform f(k). Define σ+f(k) to be f(k) for future-directed k, 0 else, and σ−f(k)
to be f(k) for past-directed k, 0 else. That is, σ+ gives us the positive-frequency part of f ,
while σ− gives the negative-frequency part. Then the “particle” creation operator a∗(σ+f)
generates a particle with a purely positive-frequency wavefunction, while the “antiparticle”
7Note that we do not yet discriminate between particles and antiparticles.
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creation operator a∗(σ−f) creates a particle with a purely negative-frequency wavefunction
(and therefore with opposite charge).
Taking the product a∗(f)a(f) gives the self-adjoint particle occupation number operator
N(f), which represents how many particles are in the state f . Thus N(σ−f) (for instance)
tells us how many (anti-)particles there are in the negative-frequency state σ−f . Summing
N(σ−f) over all the f ’s in some orthonormal basis of H therefore gives us an operator
N− representing the total number of antiparticles; by summing N(σ+f) we can likewise
construct a total particle number operator N+. It is easy to verify that conjugating the field
(transforming φ→ φ∗) switches the expectation values of N+ and N−.8
So now we have a picture of free scalar QFT involving some countable entities (negative-
frequency particles) that we identify as antimatter, and some others (positive-frequency
particles) we identify as normal matter. In other words, we have an example of the matter-
antimatter distinction, but not yet a definition. What is it for a physical system to fall under
the concept of antimatter that physicists developed in response to theoretical predictions of
the sort just summarized?
The best way to begin, perhaps, is with platitudes. In our paradigm case, antimatter is
governed by the same equation of motion as normal matter, and has the same mass. And of
course it carries opposite charge. This last fact is of physical interest in large part because
when interactions are introduced (e.g. if the system is coupled to another quantum field),
it becomes possible for a system containing equal amounts of matter and antimatter (i.e.
equal numbers of particles and antiparticles, on the naive picture) to evolve into a system
containing none of either, without violating the conservation law (5).9 This sort of evolu-
tion is what physicists call a particle-antiparticle annihilation event, or “pair annihilation.”
Likewise, without violating charge conservation, an interacting system containing no Klein-
Gordon particles (i.e., one with the Klein-Gordon vacuum as a sub-system) could evolve into
one containing equal numbers of particles and antiparticles — “pair creation.”
So when we say that there is such a thing as antimatter, we are claiming that something
like the platitudes above holds of physically possible states in QFT. Note that one of our
8This explication draws heavily on (Geroch, 1973), and readers seeking further details should consult
these precise and highly readable notes.
9Of course, even an interacting system cannot evolve into one with no matter content, period – that
would violate mass-energy conservation. But an interacting system could evolve into one containing no
Klein-Gordon matter, i.e. one in which the Klein-Gordon vacuum Ψ0 is a sub-system.
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platitudes (that matter and antimatter carry opposite charge) depends on an ontological
assumption about the nature of charge. Specifically, it requires that we can make robust
sense of the notion that two charges are “opposite” properties, in a physically fundamental
sense. In the case of scalar charges like the charge of Klein-Gordon particles, this requires
that the sign of the charge be of absolute significance. Of course there is a simple sense in
which any real number has a sign; the important distinction here is that the sign of charge
must encode physically fundamental information, if it is a fundamental fact that charges
have opposites. This is not true in general even of conserved quantities; for example, we
assign no fundamental significance to the sign of momentum, nor is there any invariant sense
in which we can ascribe “opposite momentum” to any two particles. So what is it about
charge that entails that a given charge Q has a genuine opposite, −Q?
Of course, we are free to suppose that it is simply a brute physical fact that charges have
genuine opposites. But if we can find no relevant difference in theoretical role (within QFT)
between charge and those quantities which lack genuine opposites, such a posit would seem
to have very poor epistemic support.
We will see that these questions, as well as the question of whether the notion of anti-
matter can be generalized beyond that of antiparticle, admit of natural and foundationally
significant answers within the framework of superselection sector theory in AQFT. To ex-
plore this framework, we must now explain the important results of Doplicher et al. (1971,
1974), also called the DHR picture. Eventually we will argue on the basis of these results
that a physical system counts as antimatter in virtue of standing in a certain relation (the
relation of conjugacy) to normal matter. The question of whether the matter-antimatter
distinction is fundamental then becomes the question of whether this conjugacy relation
applies to fundamental physical systems.
3 The incompleteness of the naive picture
The naive textbook picture has given us a paradigm example of antimatter, but as yet no
definition. One might think that a definition of ‘antimatter’ must have as a prerequisite a
definition of ‘antiparticle,’ since antimatter is said to be matter made of antiparticles. If
this is accurate, and if recent arguments against particles are cogent, then strictly speaking
there is no antimatter. So if the naive textbook concept is committed to this assumption, it
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is a concept with no extension — though there may be some real systems that approximate
antimatter in various ways.
A brief look at the no-particles arguments will make this tension explicit. These argu-
ments come in two forms. The first, due to Wald (1994) and Halvorson and Clifton (2001),
appeals to the non-uniqueness of particle interpretations where they are available. Even
in cases like the KG field just discussed, a particle number operator can only be defined
with the help of a complex structure. But there are many complex structures available; to
determine which we should apply, we require a notion of which solutions possess positive
frequency. The breakdown of frequencies into positive and negative depends in turn on our
notion of which momentum vectors count as future-directed. But an accelerating observer
defines the future-directed momenta differently from an inertial observer. Therefore each
observer possesses a different complex structure, and it follows that they will ascribe differ-
ent numbers of particles to the same state (e.g., according to the accelerating observer there
are particles in the state that the inertial observer would call the vacuum). We may infer
that the number operator does not represent an objective (invariant) physical property of
field-theoretic worlds. But if there were particles, we would expect that the number of them
would be an objective fact. This problem worsens in curved spacetimes, where different
families of free-falling observers will generally possess inequivalent particle concepts.
The second sort of no-particles argument, due to Fraser (forthcoming), relies on the
nonexistence of particle interpretations in physically realistic QFTs. In QFTs with inter-
actions (non-trivial couplings between fields), there is no invariant way to decompose the
solutions into positive- and negative-frequency modes. So no Fock space can be constructed,
and no operator meets the physical criteria that we would expect of the particle number
operator. Since the actual world includes interactions between fields, we may conclude that
there are no particles if QFT is correct. Both of these arguments generalize straightforwardly
to undermine the physical significance of the antiparticle number operator.
Suppose we restrict ourselves to the physically unrealistic free QFTs that do admit (non-
unique) particle interpretations, and fix one such particle interpretation as the “right one.”
Does the textbook picture at least offer an unproblematic definition of antimatter that works
in this restricted context? The textbooks can offer the beginnings of an answer, but for a
complete definition we will need to supplement them with some mathematical foundations
of QFT.
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According to a standard reference work, an antiparticle is defined to be
. . . a subatomic particle that has the same mass as another particle and equal
but opposite values of some other property or properties. For example, the
antiparticle of the electron is the positron, which has a positive charge equal
in magnitude to the electron’s negative charge. The antiproton has a negative
charge equal to the proton’s positive charge. . . (Isaacs, 1996, p. 15)
Clearly, this definition is not intended to be precise, because it does not answer the question
of which properties are supposed to have equal but opposite values. On this question, Roger
Penrose provides more detail:
[F]or each type of particle, there is also a corresponding antiparticle for which
each additive quantum number has precisely the negative of the value that it has
for the original particle. . . (Penrose, 2005, p. 66)
So, by Penrose’s account, the antiparticle is characterized by having opposite values for “ad-
ditive quantum numbers,” and the same values for all other quantities. In the literature, the
phrase “(additive) quantum number” is typically meant to denote a superselected quantity
— roughly speaking, a quantity whose value cannot change over time. Unfortunately, there
is a great deal of confusion about which quantities are subject to superselection rules; and
indeed, some physicists deny that there are any fundamental superselection rules (Aharonov
and Susskind, 1967a,b). Thus, in order to establish the fundamentality of the antimatter
concept, we will need need a principled account of which quantities are superselected. We
provide such an account in Section 5. But before we discuss superselection rules, we note a
couple of further conceptual difficulties in understanding antimatter in terms of “negative”
values for quantities.
First, the description “the negative value of a quantity” does not always pick out an
objective relation between properties. To take a ridiculously simplified example, suppose
that we arbitrarily set the center of the universe in Princeton, NJ. Then Philadelphia is the
“anticity” of New York, because the vector from Princeton to Philadelphia is the negative of
the vector from Princeton to New York. But this notion of “anticity” depends on an arbitrary
choice of a center of the universe — had we made Hoboken the center of the universe, then
Philadelphia would not have been the anticity of New York. Surely, the relation of being
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the antiparticle is supposed to be objective in the sense that it does not depend on some
arbitrary choice of origin.
In fact, for many physical quantities, the representation via real numbers carries surplus
structure; and, in particular, the property denoted by zero has no privileged status, nor
is there any interesting relationship between an object that has the value r and an object
that has the negative value −r. For example, an ice cube at −2 ◦F bears no particularly
interesting relationship to an ice cube at 2 ◦F. What we need, then, is some explanation for
why superselected quantities have an objective notion of “negative” that can underwrite the
antimatter concept.
But before we explain why superselected quantities have objective “negative” values,
we need to clarify what “negative” means — because it will not always be as simple as
applying a minus sign to a real number. For example, the possible values for the isospin of
a particle are half integers: 0, 1
2
, 1, 3
2
, 2, 5
2
, . . . (see Sternberg 1994, p. 181; Weinberg 2005,
p. 123). So, what is the negative, or opposite, of an isospin quantum number? Of course,
anyone acquainted with this quantity knows that a particle and its antiparticle have the
same isospin: e.g. both the proton and antiproton have isospin 1
2
. So, the isospin quantum
numbers do come equipped with a notion of the negative, or opposite; but this notion does
not coincide with the additive inverse of the corresonding half integer. We will thus need
to probe more deeply in order to find a principled method for determining the inverse of a
charge quantum number.
One prima facie tempting proposal is to suppose that quantum numbers come equipped
with group structure — i.e. there is an intrinsic notion of the neutral value, and also an
intrinsic notion of the inverse of a value. (In some groups, e.g. Z2, every element is its own
inverse.) But the example of isospin again shows that this idea is too simplistic. Indeed,
if the isospin quantum numbers were a group, then the value 1
2
should be its own inverse
(since an isospin 1
2
particle is its own antiparticle). But it is not true, simpliciter, that the
combination of two particles of isospin 1
2
is a particle of isospin 0. Rather, two isospin 1
2
particles can combine to form particles of isospin 0 or 1. Therefore, not all superselected
quantities carry grouplike structure.
If we remain within the naive picture, then there are insuperable obstacles to identify-
ing necessary and sufficient conditions for a quantity to be reversed (or preserved) by the
transformation from matter to antimatter. In order to make further progress, we will need
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some background in group representations and superselection theory. This will lead to a
picture of quantum numbers not just as free-floating physical quantities, but as labels for
representations of a gauge group.
4 Group representation magic
An antiparticle has opposite electric charge from its corresponding particle, but the two
particles have the same isospin. Why is one quantity inverted, but not the other? In fact,
the particle and antiparticle have “conjugate” values for all superselected quantities, but the
definition of the conjugate value depends on the nature of the underlying gauge group.
To see the relation between conjugation and the gauge group, we begin with the simpler
case of electric charge. Electric charge is simpler because the corresponding gauge group
U(1), the unit circle of complex numbers, is abelian. (Recall that with the topology inherited
from C, the group U(1) is also a compact topological space, so we call it a compact topological
group.) What are the possible values of quantized electric charge? We know that the answer
should be Z, the integers. We claim now that the answer, in general, is:
Group Duality (DUAL): The charge quantum numbers for a system with abelian gauge
group G are elements of the dual group χ(G). The binary group operation on χ(G)
corresponds to a physical operation of “adding” charges; the identity element 1 ∈ χ(G)
corresponds to the “neutral” charge; and the inverse γ−1 corresponds to the “opposite”
charge.
DUAL says not only that the cardinality of the set of quantum numbers is fixed by G, but
that the quantum numbers come equipped with group structure. We postpone our attempt
to give a physical motivation for DUAL. For now, we explain the concept of a dual group,
and show how to generalize DUAL to the crucial case of nonabelian gauge groups.
Let G be a topological abelian group. The dual group χ(G) of G consists of continuous
homomorphisms of G into the multiplicative group of complex numbers of unit modulus.
The binary group operation “◦” on χ(G) is defined by pointwise multiplication
(γ1 ◦ γ2)(g) = γ1(g)γ2(g), g ∈ G, (10)
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and we equip χ(G) with the topology of uniform convergence. It is then obvious that the
map 1 ∈ χ(G) defined by
1(g) = 1, g ∈ G, (11)
is the identity element of χ(G), and for each γ ∈ χ(G), the map γ defined by pointwise
complex conjugation
γ(g) = γ(g), g ∈ G, (12)
is an inverse for γ. Therefore, χ(G) is also a topological abelian group.
DUAL gives the right result in the case of electric charge, where the gauge group G ∼=
U(1). In this case the dual group χ(G) is isomorphic to Z, the additive group of integers
(Folland, 1995, p. 89). Furthermore, DUAL provides a mathematical explanation for the
quantization of charge: if the group G is compact (as we expect of gauge groups), then the
dual group χ(G) is discrete (Folland, 1995, Proposition 4.4).
To summarize, given a topological abelian group G, there is a naturally related group,
χ(G); and if G is the gauge group then χ(G) gives (in all known cases) the correct answer
for the set of quantum numbers as well as for the group structure on this set. But what is
the physical explanation for the correctness of this mathematical recipe? As yet, we have
no physical explanation for why the algorithm DUAL works. And to further complicate the
situation, this recipe does not work — without modification — for the case where the gauge
group G is nonabelian.
When the gauge group G is nonabelian, the dual group recipe G 7→ χ(G) does not yield
the correct quantum numbers. For example, the isospin gauge group is SU(2), but there
is only one continuous homomorphism of SU(2) into complex numbers — viz. the trivial
homomorphism that maps everything to 1 — and so the dual group of SU(2) is the trivial
(one element) group. In the case of isospin, DUAL gives a radically incorrect account of the
quantum numbers.
But a different, related algorithm does work for isospin. Let C = {0, 1
2
, 1, 3
2
, . . . } denote
the set of isospin quantum numbers. We define a binary operation “⊗” on C to represent
the composition of charges (isospins), so that X⊗Y is a system composed of charges X and
Y . Similarly, we define a binary operation “⊕” to represent a mixture of possible charges,
so that X ⊕ Y is a system which may have either charge X or charge Y ; the theory doesn’t
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tell us which. The charge 0 ∈ C is the privileged neutral quantum number in the sense that
X ⊗ 0 = X = 0⊗X, (13)
for all X. However, a composite X ⊗ Y is typically not itself a quantum number, i.e. is not
an element of C. For example, 1
2
⊗ 1
2
cannot be identified with any particular element of C;
rather,
1
2
⊗ 1
2
= 0⊕ 1. (14)
The general formula for composing isospin quantum numbers is given by the Clebsch-Gordan
formula:
X ⊗ Y =
X+Y⊕
Z=|X−Y |
Z (15)
(see Sternberg, 1994, p. 184), where the direct sum runs from |X − Y | to |X + Z| in incre-
ments of 1. The operation “⊗” is sometimes given a dynamical interpretation: e.g., when
two particles with quantum number 1
2
“collide”, then they annihilate to produce particles
with quantum numbers in the set {0, 1}. But this cannot be a strictly accurate understand-
ing of the formalism, which can after all be used to model free as well as interacting systems.
Instead, we should understand it as representing a relationship between the charges of com-
ponent systems and the charge of the composite system they form. This implies that the
charges of the component systems do not uniquely determine the charge of the composite
system; a system composed of two 1
2
charges may have either charge 0 or 1, depending on
other (non-charge) features of the component systems. Then, because charge quantum num-
bers are conserved by dynamical evolution, we can infer that any interaction will result in a
system with one of these charges.
The physicists’ magic recipe (Eq. 15) makes spectacular predictions about systems whose
gauge group is SU(2). In fact, this recipe and the related recipe for general SU(n) are
the abstract backbone of the standard model of particle physics. The operation “⊗” is
interpreted by physicists as the composition of charges, but the space of charges is not a
group under “⊗”. So the notion of charges as elements of a group does not survive the
transition from abelian to nonabelian symmetries.
We wish now to find some rationale for the apparently magical recipe (Eq. 15) for com-
posing isospin quantum numbers. The first step in this explanation — which we take up in
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the remainder of this section — is to show that the recipe follows from group representation
theory. The second step in the explanation — which we take up in the following section —
is to show that representations of the gauge group correspond to superselection sectors of
the quantum field theory.
Recall that Group Duality (DUAL) tells us that for a system with an abelian gauge
group G, the quantum numbers have the structure of a group, in particular the dual group
χ(G). The relationship between G and its dual χ(G), known as Pontryagin duality, does not
generalize straightforwardly for arbitrary compact groups.
In order to generalize DUAL, we need to move from group theory into category theory. A
category is given by a class of objects (e.g. A,B,C, . . . ) and a class of arrows or morphisms
(f, g, h, . . . ) that relate ordered pairs of objects. When A and B are related by arrow f , we
write f : A → B.10 An important sort of relation between categories is given by functors.
A covariant functor from C to D is a mapping that takes each object A of C and returns an
object F (A) of D, and another mapping that takes each arrow f : A→ B in C and returns
an arrow F (f) : F (A)→ F (B) of D. The arrow mapping is required to preserve composition
[F (f ◦g) = F (f)◦F (g)] and identity arrows [F (1A) = 1F (A)]. A contravariant functor is just
like a covariant functor except that it reverses the direction of arrows [if f : A → B then
F (f) : F (B)→ F (A)].
The notion of duality in DUAL has a natural category-theoretic expression. To make
this clear, let’s define the necessary terms in category language. Recall the group-theoretic
definition, for any topological abelian group G, of its dual χ(G). In category-theoretic
language, we have a mapping χ on the objects in the category AbTop of topological abelian
groups. This object map naturally extends to a contravariant endofunctor: for each group
homomorphism s : G → K, define a corresponding group homomorphism χ(s) : χ(K) →
χ(G) by setting
χ(s)(γ) = γ ◦ s, γ ∈ χ(K). (16)
Obviously, χ(s ◦ t) = χ(t) ◦χ(s), and so χ is a contravariant functor. In fact, χ2 is naturally
isomorphic11 to the identity functor on AbTop; in particular, for each object G of AbTop,
10For any two morphisms f : A → B and g : B → C, a category must also contain a third composite
arrow, g ◦ f : A→ C, and composition is required to be associative. For each object A there is also required
to be an identity arrow 1A : A→ A such that 1A ◦ f = f for all f : B → A, and g ◦ 1A = g for all g : A→ C.
11Given two functors F,G from category C to category D, a natural transformation α : F ⇒ G is a
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there is an isomorphism αG : χ
2(G)→ G. This fact gives the precise sense in which χ(G) is
a ‘dual object’ of G (see Folland, 1995; Roeder, 1971, 1974)
But this form of duality does not extend to compact nonabelian groups. The major
difficulty with attempted generalizations is that there does not seem to be any way to
construct a contravariant functor χ on the category of compact groups, such that χ2 is
naturally isomorphic to the identity functor. So from mathematical considerations alone we
have reason to suspect that quantum numbers might not generally carry grouplike structure.
In order to generalize DUAL to arbitrary compact groups, we need a more sophisticated
notion of the dual of a group. Could DUAL be a special case of a rule that also applies
to nonabelian groups? For G = U(1), for example, we know that the integers parametrize
the continuous homomorphisms from G to complex numbers, and so they form the dual
group χ(G). But the integers also parametrize the irreducible unitary representations of G,
which are given in a Hilbert space by the phase transformations piz(θ) = e
izθ, for θ ∈ G and
z ∈ Z.12 More generally, the dual group of an abelian group G is part of (viz. the irreducible
elements of) the category Rep(G) of the Hilbert space representations of G. So we can try
generalizing DUAL as
Group Duality 2 (DUAL2): For a system with compact gauge group G, the quantum
numbers have the structure of the category Rep(G), whose objects are unitary repre-
sentations of G on finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces and whose arrows are intertwiners
between these representations.
Thanks to the pioneering work of Tannaka, and more recent developments by Deligne, Do-
plicher, and Roberts, we now know the reason why there is no group that is naturally dual
to a compact nonabelian group. In short, a nonabelian group G does have a dual, but the
dual is not a group; it is the category Rep(G).
Before explaining at length why DUAL2 is true, we should emphasize its importance.
DUAL2 has much to teach us about the nature of antimatter. We’re looking for a notion of
collection of arrows
{αX : F (X)→ G(X) | X is an object of C},
such that if f : X → Y then αY ◦ F (f) = G(f) ◦ αX . We say that α is a natural isomorphism just in case
each αX is an isomorphism.
12A unitary representation of a group G is a pair (H,pi) where H is a Hilbert space and pi is a homomor-
phism of G into the group of unitary operators on H.
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“opposite” that applies to additive quantum numbers, so that we can explain why matter and
antimatter systems take on opposite values for these numbers. We’ve seen that the group-
theoretic notion of opposite (the inverse) is insufficient, since not all quantum numbers form
groups. But Rep(G) includes a more general notion of opposite: representations of G always
possess so-called conjugates. Indeed, for each Hilbert space H and basis {ei}, there is an
antiunitary mapping J defined by setting J(
∑
i ciei) = ciei. Then given a representation
(H, pi) of G, we can define another representation pi on H by setting pi(g) = J−1pi(g)J , for
all g ∈ G. In the case where the representation pi is one-dimensional, i.e. a homomorphism
of G into U(1), the conjugate pi is simply the map that assigns the conjugate scalar.
Since Rep(G) has an intrinsic notion of conjugates, we can use this to define the “op-
posite” of a quantum number. In the following section, we will see that each element of
Rep(G) also corresponds to a family (folium) of states, which allows us to define antimatter
as those states associated with the representation conjugate to that of matter states. Unlike
the naive picture, this definition makes no appeal to the notion of particle, and indeed it
applies to many states that lack particle interpretations. Along the way we’ll show why
additive quantum numbers are always conserved.
But this is somewhat premature. At this point all we have is a rule (DUAL2) that takes
as input a QFT’s internal symmetry group and outputs its charge quantum numbers. Why
does DUAL2 succeed?
5 What makes the magic work?
Group representation theory is like the magician’s hat of elementary particle physics. Once
the symmetry group is fixed, we need only consult our local group representation theorist
in order to obtain a complete classification of elementary particles, based on their charge
quantum numbers. We have seen that DUAL2 is the key step in this process, but not why it
works. Understanding the success of DUAL2 requires a grasp of superselection rules. DUAL2
is a natural consequence of the fact that, in AQFT, the physical property of a charge (or
additive quantum number, or superselection sector) corresponds to a representation of the
gauge group, i.e. an element of Rep(G). Furthermore, superselection theory also provides
a natural explanation of why all additive quantum numbers are conserved, since it is dy-
namically impossible for a state to change sectors. To see why, read on as we expound the
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details.
5.1 Superselection rules
We begin by recalling how the formalism of C∗-algebras makes precise the idea of a superse-
lection rule between quantum states. (For a detailed exposition, see Earman, forthcoming).
Roughly speaking, a superselection rule prohibits superposing two given pure states. This ef-
fectively tells us that the state vectors for a system are not contained in a single Hilbert space
(all elements of which can be superposed); rather, the states are contained in a collection of
two or more disjoint Hilbert spaces.
Recall that a C∗-algebra A is an algebra (i.e. it has both addition and multiplication
operations) over the complex numbers (i.e. there is a product cx for c ∈ C and x ∈ A) that
has an antilinear involution x 7→ x∗, and a norm ‖ · ‖ : A→ R+ relative to which
‖xy‖ ≤ ‖x‖ · ‖y‖, and ‖x∗x‖ = ‖x‖2,
for all x, y ∈ A. It is also assumed that A is complete relative to this norm (i.e. all Cauchy
sequences converge), and that A has a multiplicative identity 1. The motivating examples
of C∗-algebras are algebras of n× n matrices over complex numbers or, more generally, the
algebra B(H) of bounded linear operators on a Hilbert space H.
We call a positive, trace 1 operator on H a state on B(H), since such a density operator
can be understood as an assignment of expectation values to observables (self-adjoint oper-
ators) acting on H. More generally, if A is a C∗-algebra then a state on A is a linear map
ω : A → C such that ω(x∗x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ A, and ω(1) = 1. A state ω on A is said to be
pure if ω = aρ+ (1− a)σ, with a ∈ (0, 1) and ρ, σ states of A, entails that ρ = σ = ω. The
standard gloss on this formalism is that if observables in A represent physical quantities,
then a pure state on A represents a physical possibility. A non-pure (mixed) state represents
an ignorance measure over possibilities.
The basic physical idea behind superselection rules is that the states of a system fall into
equivalence classes: {[ω] : ω is a state of A}. Within each equivalence class, or sector, the
pure states can be superposed to give another pure state. However, a ‘superselection rule’
forbids the superposition of states from different equivalence classes. In order for this to
work, the relevant equivalence relation must be
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Same sector. If ω and ρ are states of A, then we say that ω ∼ ρ just in case there is a
unitary operator u ∈ A such that ω(u∗xu) = ρ(x) for all x ∈ A. (Recall that u is
unitary iff u∗u = 1 = uu∗.)
That is, two states are in the same sector just in case there is a unitary mapping between
them.
Trivially, this explains why no state can ever change sectors. Quantum dynamics is
unitary, so if ω can change into ρ then a unitary mapping must exist. We say that sectors
are ‘dynamical islands’ which no state can ever leave.
Just like groups, C∗-algebras have Hilbert space representations. We can use this fact,
combined with a beautiful result of Gelfand, Naimark and Segal, to determine when two
states are in the same sector. A representation of a C∗-algebra A is a pair (H, pi) where
H is a Hilbert space, and pi is a ∗-homomorphism [an algebra homomorphism such that
pi(x∗) = pi(x)∗] of A into B(H). A representation (H, pi) of A is said to be irreducible just in
case no non-trivial subspaces of H are invariant under pi(A).
GNS Theorem. For each state ω of A, there is a representation (Hω, piω) of A, and a
vector Ω ∈ Hω such that ω(x) = 〈Ω, piω(x)Ω〉, for all x ∈ A, and the vectors {piω(x)Ω :
x ∈ A} are dense in Hω. This representation is unique in the sense that for any other
representation (H, pi) satisfying the previous two conditions, there is a unitary operator
u : Hω → H such that upiω(x) = pi(x)u, for all x in A.
The theorem says, in short, that every state on A has a unique “home” Hilbert space
representation of A. Using it, we can show that ω ∼ ρ just in case there is a vector ϕ in the
GNS Hilbert space Hω for ω such that ρ(x) = 〈ϕ, piω(x)ϕ〉, for all x ∈ A. Thus ω ∼ ρ tells
us, roughly, that ω and ρ are “vectors in the same Hilbert space.”
Now, ω ∼ ρ iff there is a unitary operator u : piω → piρ.13 Thus, the superselection
sectors of states correspond to unitary equivalence classes of representations of A. In other
13Proof: If ω ∼ ρ then there is a unitary operator v ∈ A such that ω(a) = ρ(v∗av) for all a ∈ A. But the
vector piω(v)Ωω is cyclic in Hω for piω(A), and
ρ(a) = 〈piω(v)Ωω, piω(a)piω(v)Ωω〉,
for all a ∈ A. By the uniqueness of the GNS representation, it follows that (Hω, piω) and (Hρ, piρ) are
unitarily equivalent.
Conversely, suppose that there is a unitary operator u : Hω → Hρ such that upiω(a) = piρ(a)u for all
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words, for a system with observable algebra A, the ‘charge quantum numbers’ are names
for isomorphism classes of objects in the category Rep(A) of representations of A. Rep(A)’s
objects are Hilbert space representations of M , and the arrows from (H, pi) to (H ′, pi′) are
given by bounded linear operators from H to H ′ such that vpi(x) = pi′(x)v, for all x in A.
According to the algebraic formalism, quantum numbers label dynamically isolated is-
lands of states, and hence conserved properties of physical objects. But if we remain at this
level of abstraction, then the quantum numbers have very little structure — not enough to
support the sorts of explanations provided by elementary particle physics. In particular,
the category Rep(A) does not have a tensor product, and so cannot support the notion of
composing superselection sectors or quantum numbers (which we’ve seen is needed in the
case of isospin). Indeed, consider how we might try to define the tensor product pi ⊗ pi′ of
two representations (H, pi) and (H ′, pi′) of a C∗-algebra A. It would seem natural to use the
tensor product H ⊗ H ′ of the Hilbert spaces. But the mapping A 3 x 7→ pi(x) ⊗ pi′(x) is
not linear, and so is not a representation. Other attempts to define the tensor product of
representations also end in failure.
In order to give the quantum numbers additional structure, we must place additional
physical constraints on our algebra of observables. The obvious place to look is special
relativity, since relativistic QFT ought to share its symmetries. To implement this, we’ll
need to associate our physical quantities (operators) with regions of Minkowski spacetime:
1) Assign to each double cone O a unital C∗-algebra A(O), representing the observable
quantities localized within O. We require that if O1 ⊆ O2 then there is an injection
i1,2 : A(O1)→ A(O2), and so the mapping O 7→ A(O) is a “net” of algebras. Since the
double cones of Minkowski spacetime are directed under inclusion, there is an inductive
limit C∗-algebra A generated by the A(O).
Since the theory is supposed to be relativistic, we assume that spacelike-separated observables
a ∈ A. Thus,
ω(a) = 〈Ωω, piω(a)Ωω〉 = 〈uΩω, upiω(a)Ωω〉 = 〈uΩω, piρ(a)uΩω〉,
for all a ∈ A. Since ρ is pure, the representation (Hω, piω) is irreducible, and it follows that there is a unitary
operator v in A such that piρ(v)Ωρ = uΩω. Clearly then
ρ(v∗av) = 〈uΩω, piρ(a)uΩω〉 = ω(a),
for all a ∈ A, and therefore ρ ∼ ω.
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are causally independent:
2) Microcausality: For self-adjoint a1 ∈ A(O1), a2 ∈ A(O2) and O1, O2 spacelike separated,
a1 and a2 commute.
We ensure covariance under the symmetries of relativity by insisting that
3) g 7→ αg is a representation of some group G of symmetries of Minkowski spacetime in
the group Aut(A) of automorphisms of the C∗-algebra A. Furthermore, αg(A(O)) =
A(g(O)) for each region O and symmetry g. We typically assume only covariance under
the translation group of Minkowski spacetime. We will explicitly note when we need
to assume covariance under the Euclidean group, or even under the Poincare´ group.
4) The preferred vacuum state ω0 is invariant under all symmetries:
ω0(αg(a)) = ω0(a), ∀a ∈ A,∀g ∈ G.
These four conditions, taken as axioms, constrain the models of ‘algebraic quantum field
theory’ (see Haag, 1996). Unfortunately they don’t yet provide enough structure to introduce
tensor products of superselection sectors.
5.2 DHR representations
The C∗-algebra A will typically have many more states than are needed in physics. A
selection criterion is a further condition on which states are physically possible. For example,
Arageorgis et al. (2003, p. 181) argue that, since physical possibilities must assign expectation
values to the stress-energy tensor, only so-called Hadamard states are possible. Even if they
are correct, this may not be the only necessary condition. Which selection criteria are
needed to give a plausible space of possibilities is thus a vexed question. That said, selection
criteria can be very useful even in the absence of solid justification. By “pretending” that
the physical possibilities are limited by a given criterion, we can develop a physical concept
(such as additive quantum number) that covers at least some of the possibilities, and which
can then hopefully be generalized to include all of them.
Proceeding in this spirit, the most extensively investigated criterion is that proposed by
Doplicher et al. (1969a):
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DHR selection criterion: Let (H0, pi0) be the GNS representation induced by the privi-
leged vacuum state ω0 of A. A representation (H, pi) of A is DHR iff (1) for each double
cone O, the representations pi0|A(O′) and pi|A(O′) are unitarily equivalent; and (2) (H, pi)
possesses finite statistics, that is, a finite-dimensional representation of the permuta-
tion group. Here O′ is the spacelike complement of O, and A(O′) is the C∗-algebra
generated by A(O1) with O1 a double cone spacelike separated from O.
The requirement of finite statistics is quite weak, since the standard Bose and Fermi rep-
resentations of the permutation group are both one-dimensional, and hence trivially satisfy
finite statistics. In fact, allowing finite statistics is liberal in the sense that it also permits —
but does not require — the existence of systems with parastatistics. So, all known physical
systems meet the finite statistics requirement.
The DHR states (the physically possible states according to the DHR criterion) are
elements of the folia of DHR representations. The intuitive idea is that the DHR states are
those that look identical to the vacuum state, except possibly in some bounded region of
spacetime. It is obvious that this criterion is too stringent to count as a necessary condition
for physical possibility. Charged states in electromagnetism, for instance, differ from the
vacuum at infinity due to Gauss’ law. However, the DHR criterion is the only proposal for
which we currently have a body of worked-out mathematical results. Even for the slightly
more liberal Buchholz-Fredenhagen criterion (Buchholz and Fredenhagen, 1982), we still
lack a full understanding of the category of superselection sectors. Thus, we will begin by
considering only possibilities meeting the DHR criterion.
Since A is a C∗-algebra, the collection of all of its representations are objects of a category,
Rep(A), whose arrows are intertwiners between representations. The DHR representations
of A form a sub-category DHR(A) of Rep(A), and this category has tensor products. [A cat-
egory with tensor products is called a tensor category. See (Halvorson and Mu¨ger, 2007) for
details.] Indeed, it can be shown that a representation (H, pi) of A is DHR just in case there
is a particular sort (i.e. “localized” and “transportable”) of endomorphism ρ : A → A such
that (H, pi) is unitarily equivalent to (H0, pi0◦ρ), where (H0, pi0) is the vacuum representation.
Furthermore, given two DHR representations, corresponding to two such endomorphisms ρ1
and ρ2, it can be shown that ρ1 ◦ ρ2 also corresponds to a DHR representation. This con-
struction gives us a notion of the tensor product of DHR representations — just what we
need for our additive quantum numbers. Finally the representations of our algebra have
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enough mathematical structure to represent the physical behavior we set out to describe.
We have a set of physical possibilities (the DHR states) which fall into natural families:
superselection sectors (DHR representations). Since states cannot change sectors, and sectors
(like quantum numbers) possess a tensor product, the sectors can be taken to correspond
to additive quantum numbers. But we still need to explain DUAL2. Why do the additive
quantum numbers have the same structure as the category Rep(G) of representations of the
gauge group? Since additive quantum numbers are just sectors, and the sectors form the
structure DHR(A), we can explain this by showing that Rep(G) and DHR(A) must be
equivalent categories.14
But we’re getting ahead of ourselves. We haven’t yet explained what it is for an AQFT
to possess a global internal symmetry given by a gauge group G. Once that’s out of the way,
we can go about justifying DUAL2. And then, at last, antimatter will appear.
5.3 Gauge groups and the Doplicher-Roberts reconstruction
The Doplicher-Roberts reconstruction theorem is a remarkable result, and essential to un-
derstanding DUAL2. It establishes that given an AQFT system, described in terms of its
algebra of observables A, we can derive the global gauge group G which leaves that system
invariant. We can then show that the irreducible representations of G are isomorphic to the
DHR representations of the observable algebra — exactly what we need to explain DUAL2.
The definition of an AQFT system is given purely in terms of an algebra of observables A
and a mapping O 7→ A(O) from bounded regions of spacetime to subalgebras of A. The self-
adjoint elements of A are supposed to represent measurable (at least in principle) physical
quantities, which take on values within the bounded regions O (which is why we have the
net mapping O 7→ A(O)). We might wonder what it is for such a theory so defined to have
a gauge group G, since normally all of a theory’s measurable quantities are left unchanged
by its internal symmetries. Thus every element of A should be left unchanged by G — so in
what nontrivial sense is there a symmetry at all?
To define the notion of a gauge group, we need to expand the formalism to include
unobservable, non-gauge-invariant structure. This structure is given by a field algebra F . A
field algebra is built like an algebra of observables — in particular, it has a local subalgebra
14Two categories C and D are said to be equivalent if there are functors F : C → D and G : D → C such
that G ◦ F = 1C and F ◦G = 1D.
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F (O) for every open region O — but it need not satisfy microcausality. A field algebra is
meant to signify a collection of theoretical quantities, the elements of F , which are assigned
values by the states but are not necessarily measurable, or covariant under the theory’s
internal symmetries. An AQFT then possesses an internal symmetry given by a gauge
group G just in case its algebra of observables, A, is given by the gauge-invariant part of
some field algebra F . That is,
A(O) = {a ∈ F (O) : g−1ag = a,∀g ∈ G}
for all open regions O.15
For all we’ve shown so far, an AQFT given by A may have no field algebra, or it may have
many. If so, there is no such thing as the gauge group for the theory, and DUAL2 becomes
nonsense. This is where the DR theorem comes in: it establishes that a given observable
algebra A possesses a unique distinguished field algebra F and gauge group G. The following
was first proved by Doplicher and Roberts (1990); a simpler proof appears in the appendix
to Halvorson and Mu¨ger (2007).
DR Reconstruction Theorem. Let A be an algebra of observables satisfying the axioms
of AQFT and ω0 a vacuum state on A. Then there exists a unique (up to unitary
equivalence) complete, normal field algebra F and gauge group G such that A is the
G-invariant subalgebra of F .
All that’s left is to show that Rep(G) and DHR(A) are isomorphic categories. The field
algebra F acts irreducibly on a Hilbert space H, but the subalgebra A ⊂ F of observables
typically leaves non-trivial subspaces of H invariant. In this case, H decomposes into a
direct sum of superselection sectors
H = H1 ⊕H2 ⊕ · · · ,
15More precisely, a field system with gauge group G consists of a net O 7→ F (O) of von Neumann algebras
acting on some Hilbert space H, a privileged vacuum vector Ω in H, and and also a compact gauge group
G acting (via unitary operators) on H. It is required that the gauge transformations act internally, that is
g−1F (O)g = F (O) for each double cone O and for each g ∈ G, and leave the vacuum invariant: gΩ = Ω
for all g ∈ G. There are some additional technical conditions that we can safely ignore at present —
e.g. the requirement of normal (Bose-Fermi) commutation relations between operators localized in spacelike
separated regions. See (Halvorson and Mu¨ger, 2007, p. 808)
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where A leaves each sector Hi globally invariant, and also the gauge group G leaves each
sector Hi globally invariant. (That is, if a ∈ A and ψ ∈ Hi, then aψ ∈ Hi, and similarly for
g ∈ G.) It then follows that, for each subspace Hi, the restriction of the observable algebra
A to Hi is a representation of A. To be precise, we define
pii(a) = api, ∀a ∈ A,
where pi is the orthogonal projection onto Hi. Then each (Hi, pii) is a DHR representation
of A. Furthermore, the restriction of the action of the gauge group G to Hi is a unitary
representation of the gauge group; indeed, it is equivalent to a direct sum of irreducible
representations of G, all with the same character. Thus, each sector Hi yields simultaneously
a DHR representation of A and a representation of the gauge group G, so we have a nice
one-to-one correspondence between objects of the category DHR(A) of DHR representations
and objects the category Rep(G) of representations of G. This correspondence is functorial
(Halvorson and Mu¨ger, 2007, pp. 808-815), and since quantum numbers are just labels for
DHR representations (i.e. for superselection sectors), DUAL2 follows.
At last all the formal machinery is in place to define the relation of conjugacy that holds
between matter and antimatter.
6 A quite general notion of antimatter
The naive textbook presentation has it that, at the fundamental level, a particle and its
antiparticle counterpart take on opposite values for all additive quantum numbers. We
have seen that in realistic QFTs there are no particles, and that additive quantum numbers
are just labels for superselection sectors, so really this definition is not given in physically
fundamental terms at all. We will show in this section that the real definition of antimatter
is as follows:
A matter system and its antimatter counterpart are given by states in conjugate
superselection sectors.
This definition applies at least to all states that satisfy the Buchholz-Fredenhagen (BF)
superselection criterion (Buchholz and Fredenhagen, 1982). It is more general than the
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textbook definition, since all massive free particle states satisfy the BF selection criterion, and
some BF sectors have conjugates but no particle interpretation. If we accept the BF criterion,
the superselection sectors are all elements of category C that is provably equivalent to the
category Rep(G) of representations of a compact group. The notion of conjugacy employed
in our definition is a relation between elements of Rep(G). Irreducible representations of a
compact group always possess unique conjugates; therefore, so do sectors.
When a system’s gauge group is abelian, its sectors have the structure of a group, so
for any two sectors (charge quantum numbers) X and Y there is a product X, Y 7→ X ◦ Y ,
and an inverse X 7→ X. In this special case the definition of conjugate is obvious. But
in general, the product of sectors is a tensor product in a category: X, Y 7→ X ⊗ Y . We
cannot expect that the “conjugate” X of a sector will always satisfy the defining equation
X ⊗X = X ⊗X = 1 for group inverses.
What are we looking for in a notion of conjugation for sectors? It must explain antimatter
behavior — that is, the possibility of pair annihilation. This means it must be possible for
a system composed of states ωX , ωX from X and its conjugate sector X to evolve into an
element of the zero-charge vacuum sector, which we’ll call V . Since the composite state lives
in the tensor product of these sectors, X ⊗X, it must be physically possible for a state in
this tensor product to end up in V . Since it’s impossible for states to change sectors, this
means that V must be a part (that is, a subrepresentation) of X ⊗X.
In DHR(A), the vacuum representation is always given by the identity object of the
category; i.e. V = 1. For categories like DHR(A), if there is a monomorphism from A
to B, then B is either A or the direct sum of A with some other objects, and is therefore
a subrepresentation of A. Setting B = X ⊗ X and A = 1, the conjugacy relation must
ensure that X ⊗ X = 1 ⊕ (other representations). Thus it must ensure the existence of a
monomorphism from 1 to X ⊗X. Since conjugacy should be a symmetric relation, we must
require the same for X⊗X. Thus we define conjugacy as follows (Longo and Roberts, 1997):
Definition. Let C be a tensor ∗-category and let X be an object of C. A conjugate of X
is a triple (X, r, r) where X is an object of C, and r : 1 → X ⊗X and r : 1 → X ⊗X are
arrows satisfying the ‘conjugate equations’
1X ⊗ r∗ ◦ r ⊗ 1X = 1X , (17)
1X ⊗ r∗ ◦ r ⊗ 1X = 1X . (18)
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If every non-zero object of the category C has a conjugate then we say that C has conjugates.
If (X, r, r) and (X
′
, r′, r′) both are conjugates of X then one easily verifies that 1X′ ⊗
r∗ ◦ r′ ⊗ 1X : X → X
′
is unitary. Thus conjugates, if they exist, are unique up to unitary
equivalence.
Do conjugates exist in the relevant category, namely the category of sectors? Recall first
that in the category Rep(G) of representations of a compact group G, the conjugate of (H, pi)
is defined by
pi(g) = J−1pi(g)J, ∀g ∈ G, (19)
where J is an antiunitary operator on H. In this case, a linear map r : 1 → pi ⊗ pi can
be defined by setting r(1) =
∑
i Jei ⊗ ei, and then extending linearly. Similarly, the arrow
r : 1→ pi ⊗ pi is defined by setting r(1) =∑i ei ⊗ Jei. Some elementary linear algebra then
shows that (pi, r, r) satisfies the conjugate equations, and so Rep(G) has conjugates.
In the case of the category DHR(A) of superselection sectors, the existence of a conjugate
sector is guaranteed for any sector that can be reached from the vacuum by application of
field operators (Doplicher et al., 1969b). So, if a field net O 7→ F (O) is given a priori, then
every sector has a conjugate. Furthermore, even if only the observable net O 7→ A(O) is
given a priori, a sector has a conjugate iff it has finite statistics (Doplicher et al., 1971),
and the existence of a conjugate is also independently guaranteed for any sector with a mass
gap (Fredenhagen, 1981). Indeed, proving the existence of conjugate sectors is a key step
in the Doplicher-Roberts reconstruction, which shows that the category of sectors (i.e. the
category DHR(A)) is equivalent to the category of representations of the gauge group (i.e.
the category Rep(G)).
We’ve ended up with a rather orderly picture. Any state ω meeting the DHR condition
lives in a DHR representation. Every DHR representation has a unique conjugate. And
every state in the conjugate representation is conjugate to ω. Thus for any “matter” state
we might choose, if it is DHR we have a whole representation full of “antimatter” states
which can annihilate it while conserving all additive quantum numbers (that is, without
changing sectors) if the two states are composed.
We are now in a position to challenge some assumptions of the naive picture. Most
importantly, we can show that the concept of antimatter is not confined solely to particle
systems. Nothing about our definition of conjugate rules out non-particle systems — but
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can we show that there are QFT systems, with no particles, to which it applies?
We can. By the plausible argument of Fraser (forthcoming), no interacting QFT admits
a particle interpretation. One theory that falls under Fraser’s purview is the Yukawa interac-
tion between charged fermions and neutral bosons, used to describe the strong force as it acts
between mesons and nucleons. Summers (1982) has shown that the two-dimensional version
of this theory (Yukawa2, one of the few interacting QFTs which has been proven to exist)
satisfies the DHR condition. So a state of the Yukawa2 theory is a clear example of a state
with no particle interpretation, but which possesses conjugates — therefore, antimatter.
As noted in the Introduction, Wallace (2008) has claimed this is impossible.16 For Wal-
lace, the existence of antimatter requires a particle interpretation, and so antimatter only
exists in free QFT. This may seem strange even in the absence of our results, since anti-
matter is supposed to explain pair creation and annihilation events which can only occur in
interacting theories. Wallace might hold that his antimatter concept applies approximately
in the asymptotic scattering limit, and can therefore do the needed explanatory work with-
out applying exactly. But we find it much more satisfying to suppose that it is exactly true
that matter-antimatter annihilation events can occur in interacting QFT — and this is what
we have shown, using the machinery of DHR.
The restrictiveness of the DHR criterion is, we grant, an outstanding limitation for our
antimatter concept. Since charged states in electrodynamics are globally, as well as locally,
inequivalent to the vacuum, we cannot at present prove that these states possess conjugates.
That is a project for future research. The existence of conjugates has already been shown
for QFTs (in four spacetime dimensions) meeting the less stringent Buchholz-Fredenhagen
condition, which requires equivalence to the vacuum outside one spacelike cone (Doplicher
and Roberts, 1990, pp. 75–85). DHR superselection theory has also been generalized to the
case of curved spacetimes (see Brunetti and Ruzzi, 2007), allowing us to define antimatter
in yet another arena where particle interpretations fail. Since the nonexistence of conjugates
has only been proven for systems with infinite statistics, which no known physical systems
16Wallace uses ‘antimatter’ to describe a narrower set of cases than we do — for him, a system has
antimatter only if it has nontrivial superselection sectors. That is to say, antimatter for Wallace occurs
only when a particle and its conjugate live in unitarily inequivalent sectors; he does not count self-conjugate
systems as possessing antimatter. This difference amounts to a mere choice of words, we think, especially
since Summers’ Yukawa2 theory is nontrivial in Wallace’s sense. But we also think our choice of words is
closer to that of practicing physicists, who are happy to say that “the photon is its own antiparticle.”
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obey, we are optimistic that proofs of their existence can be generalized. Even if not, our
main point stands: the antimatter concept does not stand or fall with the particle concept.
It may (or may not) stand or fall with physically unrealistic restrictions on the space of
states, like DHR, in which case there may be no antimatter in nature. But the notion of
antimatter is in no way parasitic on the particle notion.
Of course, like Wallace’s, our antimatter concept also applies to free and asymptotic
scattering states. So if need be, we can co-opt Wallace’s claim that the concept of antimatter
applies at least approximately to non-DHR states which resemble free states. But at least
our definition is strictly more general than his.
Besides the conceptual dependence of antimatter on particles, another view that has been
aired in the literature (especially in Feynman’s popular writings) is that matter is antimatter
moving “backward in time.”
The backwards-moving electron when viewed with time moving forwards appears
the same as an ordinary electron, except it’s attracted to normal electrons — we
say it has positive charge. . . For this reason it’s called a ‘positron’. The positron
is a sister to the electron, and it is an example of an ‘anti-particle’.
This phenomenon is general. Every particle in Nature has an amplitude to move
backwards in time, and therefore has an anti-particle. (Feynman, 1985, p. 98)
Feynman’s thought is motivated by the behavior of antimatter in the case of free particles,
in which a particle and its antiparticle have opposite frequency. Since negative-frequency
particles have past-directed wave vectors, it appears natural to say that these particles are
moving “back in time.”
Is this picture borne out by our definition of conjugate? In order for this to hold, it would
have to be the case that a state and its conjugate have opposite temporal orientations. This
would require that, if a state ω has future-directed momentum, its conjugate state(s) must
have past-directed momentum. But, as shown in Corollary 5.3 of Doplicher et al. (1974),
all Poincare´ covariant DHR sectors meet the spectrum condition, which requires that all
their states have future-directed momentum. We suspect that Feynman’s view arises from
ignoring that, when the proper complex structure is applied to free particle systems, an
antiparticle’s wave vector and its four-momentum have opposite temporal orientation. So,
in the standard form of free QFT as well as in all DHR sectors, both matter and antimatter
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systems always move “forward in time” by virtue of meeting the spectrum condition.
It remains to be seen whether an alternative (perhaps empirically equivalent) formal-
ism can be devised on which Feynman’s claim holds true, but it is straightforwardly false
according to the standard formalism. Further, superselection theory provides a plausible ex-
planation of its falsity. The relationship between matter and antimatter (conjugate sectors)
arises from a physical system’s global internal symmetries (its gauge group). But one would
expect any relationship between a particle and its past-directed counterpart to be grounded
in its external spacetime symmetries. Insofar as internal and external symmetries really are
different in kind and not just in name, we should expect Feynman’s claim to turn out false.
7 Conclusions
The dogma that antimatter is matter made up of antiparticles has been turned on its head.
We have shown that the concept of antimatter is strictly more general than this naive picture
would suggest, since it applies perfectly well to physical systems with no particle interpre-
tation. Decades of careful research in AQFT have shown that all DHR states, as well as
Buchholz-Fredenhagen states, possess antimatter counterparts. If these conditions together
were true of all physically possible states, the distinction between matter and antimatter
would be fundamental, in the sense of applying to all the fundamental constituents of the
relativistic quantum world.
As it turns out, these conditions are too restrictive to include all of the physical possibil-
ities. But there is also no known obstacle to generalizing the results of DHR even further.
So for all we know, our world may be made up of matter and antimatter even at the most
fundamental level of quantum field-theoretic description, the level at which we err when we
claim that there are particles.
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